Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

Jay O. Barnhart and Vida N. Barnhart v. Civil
Service Employees Insurance Co. : Brief of
Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Christensen and Jensen; Attorneys for Appellant;
Howard & Lewis; Attorneys for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Barnhart and Civil Service Employees Insurance Co., No. 10133 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4580

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
JAY 0. BARNHART and VIDA
BARNHART,

·"~'LED
;r~
l JUL l ? lgSA

. .
Plamtiffs
and Responden:ts,

•.

-·- :· ···c\ork.

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

__ ------ ·- ·c·-------rt···-:u·--:------.. h

6A8i

----···

0

OU

I

NO. 10188

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth District Court
for Utah Ooonty
Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge

JACKSON B. HOWARD
HOWARD AND LEWIS
290 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
RAY CHRISTENSEN
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN
Suite 1205, Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant

0c1·7

1966

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
..

-- --·.--

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Statement of Kind of Case ........................ .

1

Disposition in Lower Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Relief Sought on Appeal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Statement of Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Argument

3

POINT I
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

POINT

3

n

ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONTRACTS
ARE SEVERABLE FROM THE CONTRACT AND
ARE VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE.............

5

CASES CITED

modget Co. v. Bebe Co., 214 Pac. 38. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre, 82 Utah 279, 17 P.
2d 294 .................................... 13, 14

JellSln v. Union Paving Co., 97 Cal. App. 2d 637, 218
P. 2d 134....................................

5

Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 580, 57 P. 2d
1132 ................................. 13, 14, 19
Johnson v. Nas, 50 Wash. 2d 87, 309 P. 2d 380.......

5

Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utaih 364, 160 P. 2d
421 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Laurence v. Bamberger R. R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 282
P. 2d 335....................................

5

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Myers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio State 101, 57 N.E. 1089. . . .

18

O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 Utah 2d 102, 306 P. 2d 1073. . . . .

5

Prim v. Prim, 45 Cal. 2d 690, 299 P. 2d 231. . . . . . . . . .

4

Shumaker v. Utex Exploration Co., 157 F. Supp. 68....

13

Wilson v. Gregg, 208 Okl. 291, 255 P. 2d 517 ........ 17, 19
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Accident Claims Tribunal Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Annotation 135 A.L.R. 85 ...................... , . .

18

Aroitration Under Accident CLaims Tribunal Rules ... 6, 7, 9
5 Am. Jur. 2d 547 Sec. 36.........................

17

5 Am. Jur. 2d 548 Sec. 36 Note 15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Best's Insurance News, Fire and Olsualty edition.....

7

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Cotirt of the
State of Utah

JAY 0. BARNHART and VIDA N.
BARNHART,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
)
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEEJS
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 10133

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Respondents accept appellant's statement.
DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT
Respondents accept appellant's statement..
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affumation of judgment below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Basically the respondents agree with the facts Slllibmltted by appellant; however, there are a few important
and salient areas wherein the facts are in o<mtrorv&Sy, and
the appellant's statement of facts fiail to show the controverted facts. These are:
(1) The respondent may have been 82 feet south
of the break in the double yellow lines, but she was still
in a position to make the left hand turn ornto old Hli:ghway
91 within the area designated "G", whlch is commonly used
for making the turn onto old U. S. 91. (R. 5·9; TR. 27).
(2) The respondent, Mrs. Barnhart, did not see any
north bOIUilld truck intending to make a left hand turn across
the south bound lanes. (R. 59; TR. 49). She stated that
she looked in 'beT rear view mirTor (R. 59; TR. 49) and
that she saw the driver, Wei1cker, approaching her and
that she had an opportunity to bra~ce hemelf momentarily
prior to the collision. (R. 59; TR. ~9). She at no time
saw :the truck referred to by Weicker and it is not likely
that the truck existed, based upon her a:bilities to observe
and the ciTcumstances surrounding the collision.
( 3) Entrance to the old Hlighway 91 involves a large
approach apron that is several hundred feet in width. The
approach is on the curve of the highway as it runs east and
west and then curves toward the south. (See EXhibit 2).
(4) The facts concerning insurance eorverage are contained under the designatioo B. The facts as to insurance
coverage, are substantially correct. The main difference
is that prior to the trial of this case, 1lhe plaintiffs, of their
own mortion, dismrssed their cause concerning loss of consortium on behalf of Mr. Barnhart. (R. 59; TR. 3). This
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dismissal did not take place at the appellant's instant nor
ut>On motion of the trial court.
ARGUMENT

POINr I
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFIi'JRMED.

POINT

n

ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONTRAGrS
ARE SEVERABLE FROM TI-lE CONTRACT AND ARE
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE.

There was substantial evidence available to the court
to justify the conclusion that it came to. The key to the
c11tire problem of fact could probaJbly be answered in stating that even if the respondent violated the statutory stanard of care, which the respondent denies, this violation
would not prohibit the recovery if it was not a proximate
cause contributing to the injury. The key to the question
was whet.~er the respondent's conduct in any way proocimately caused the collision. The court rightfully held that
it did not.
Even accepting Welcker's, the uninsured motorist's,
version of the collision, no fault or blame, causation wise,
can be placed upon Mrs. Barnhart. (R. 59; TR. 11, ·12,
13). The truck never came into his lane of tmffic, never
crossed in front of him, was not observed by Mrs. Barnhart, and mysteriously vanished after the collision. (R.
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59; TR. 16.). In fact Welcker's tes:timony was inoo.nsistent.
For eX1ample, the following:
"Q. If this were west, going this way, (Indicating), would yoo say the Olsen truck was in this vicinity, somewhere, where I am pointing?
"A. Yes, siT, I think so.
"Q. And was it signaling to make a turn into
the opposite lane of traffic?

"A. Well, I am not sure. When I seen him last,
he was parked on t!he side of the road near the field."
R. 59; TR. 16).
W elcker further testified that he was not sure if he
had to leave his lane of traffic to go around fue truck, but
if so, "just a little bit." (R. 59; TR. 13). He also stated
that tile impact involved the right front of his vehicle and
the left reax of the plaintiff's vehicle. Mr. Welcker even
pla~ced and labeled the vehicles on :the diagmm.
(Exhibit
2, R. 59; TR. 16, 19, 20 & 21). It would be difficult to
correlate the diagram with hds testimony. The testimony
and diagram certainly do not e:oou:se the negli:gence of

We1cker and do justify the eourt's finding of fact based
upon substantial evidenJce. '.Dhe rule is specifically set out
in Prim v. Prim, 45 Cal. 2d 690, 299 P. 2d 231:
"This is the sole question presented for determination:
:Ls there substantial evidence in the record to support
the findings of fact serf: forth above?
"Yes. The rule is esta!blished :that when a. finding of
fact is attacked on tlhe ground that there is not any
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of the
appellate cou.rt begins and ends with a detemrlnatioo
as to wllefuer there is any substantial evidence, coo-
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tradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
findiug of fact."
(Jensen v. Union Paving Company, 97 2d Cal. App. 637,
218 P. 2d 134; Johnson v. Nas, 50 Wash. 2d 87, 309 P. 380;
Laurence v. Brunberger Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 282
P.2d ~~~5; O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 Utah 2d 102, 306 P. 2d 1073.)
POINT II
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CONI'RAGrS ARE
SEVERABLE FROM THE CONTRACI' AND ARE VOID
AND UNENFORCEABLE.

The main point of argument raised by the appellant
concerns the arbitration provision in 1Jhe ·contract. Appellant begins i:ts dissertation by quoting articles from insurance company publications, to-wit: Plwnmer's article in
the Insurance Law Journ·al and Fieting's article in Best's
Insurance News, Fire and Casualty edition. We do not
believe that articles in particular trade journals are authorative citations in court. These articles, however, give
the respondent an opportunity to reply in kind, in an essay
form, concerning arbitration. The articles cited are from
a strictly biased standpoint and overlook the fact that
plaintiffs seldom have sufficient oontinuity of interest to
publish law journals, to retain permanent counsel or to
write essays on particular legal theorems.
The clause cited in the insurance contract required
arbitration "in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association, and judgment upon :the award
rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof." We respectfully suibrnit to
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the Court that such a p~ovision is a genuine attempt to
relieve the courts of jurisdiction over eauses that are inherently judicial in nature. We respectfully state to the
court that such a provision is an unco!llStitutional deprivation to the parties of a right to have their matter heard in
court and of a right to have a jury trial if they so des:ire.
The unfair aspect of this particular pro!Vi:sion to tihe
unwary insurance purchaser is that the American Arbitration Association is not an impartial, unbiased tribunal
fior the hearing of insurance matters.
The American Mbitration Association, insofar as uninsured motorists we concerned, is the minion of the insu~ance ,companies combined.
The filing fees, althO/Ugh
less than nominal, are insufficient to support its operation.
It is an organization that exists on the gratuities of tlhe
insurance company.
According to the literature o!f the Amerioan Arbitration Association, m 1950, at the instance of certain insurance companies, they agreed to arbitrate claims for the
insurance companies if provision for such arbitration was
provided in the insurance companies' policies. The American Arbitration Association literature states "It was their
(the insurance oon1panies) desire that the fee for such arbitrations be set at a· nominal amonnt of no greater than
$50.00, rather than have it in accordance with the schedule
of fees prescribed in our commercial rules.*** The association agreed to write a speci8l set of rules incorpornting
the $50.00 fee. Because the insurance companies in tum
agreed that they wo~d subscribe to a special budget to
cover the difference between what the association would
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receive at the nominal $50.00 rate and the rate of fees mder tlw commercial arbitration rules. •• •"

The motto of the American Association is "speed,
eeonomy, justice." It is rather interesting that Mr. Fieting
in Best's Insurance News, Fire and Casualty edition, Octobl'l', 1961, state3 the purpose of arbitration is "Pro~de a
speedy, just and economical means for deteTillining the
amount of the insurer's payment liability." The American
Arbitration Association claims to have used those terms
since 1926. The point of the dissertation bedng that Fieting's article is northing more than a propaganda dissertation for and on behalf of the American Arbitration Association.
Under the title "Selecting the Arbitrator" the literature of the American Arbitration Association states:

"The next step involved is the selection of the arbitrator. A ~aclal accident claims panel of arbitratoTS
has been created consisting of attorneys who have
been nominated by bar associations throughout the
country or by other attorneys who are nort commercial arbitrators of this association's national panel. To
give the insurance companies and the policy holders
the most acceptable arbitrators, one rule is that no
attorney working for an insurance company or specializing in negligence cases may seTVe in- accident claims
cases. Arhitraton; are appointed administratively by
the Association without the submission of lists to the
parties. • • *"
One rmght ask what 'the other rules are for the selection of arbitrators which are not specified in the literature furnished to the insured or his counsel. Undoubtedly, the insurance companies are better 'acquainted with
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the rules for the selection of an arbitrator than those who
receive the literature.
UndeT Section 11 of its aooident clims rules, the liti-

gants are informed as foUorvvs:
"The arbitrators will be appomted from a special accident daims panel. Members of the panel serve without fee in accident daims arbibraUons. In prolonged
or in special oases, the parties n1ay agree to the payment of a fee. Any arrangement [or the oompensatioo of a panel arbitrator shall be made only tlwough
the :administrator.''

Claimant's attorneys who have had experience befo['e
the Arbitration Ass:ociartioo contend that in many instances
the arbitrators are unqualified because of lack of e;qJerlence
or are seeking only recognition from those who ean prop'"
erly reward such talents. The proceeding is tried in a
most informal basis without a record, and the litigants
must necessarily depend upon the note taking of the arbitrator, who does not have available to him a court reporter or a reco['d from which he could clarify a ,coo.fusing aspect of the case upon delibeTation. If a record is
to be kept, it has to be kept by one of the parties at the
party's expense, whlch, of course, is of no value to the
arbitrator. Furthermore, the rules provide no means for
a:ppeal. The decision of the arbitrator is final.
Thel}e are many shortcomings in arbitration and many

reasons why a person might prefeT to litigate his cases in
court where he had the right of due process. Due p-rocess
presumes a fair hearing from beginning to end with the
right of appeal in O['lder to review posSiible error of the trial
judge, such as that the appellant claims here burt which it
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woulu deny the re3pondent by arbitration.

The arbitrator

acts informally and, acc'Ording to the publications of the
American Arbitration Society, "The object of examination
of witnesses is to get the fact; arbitrators will usually perml t witnesse,:; to go somewhat afield as long as relevant
Llds are being produced. ,.,u, "He (the arbitrartoc) is the
one who must be convinced, not a jury of laymen who might
perhaps be more taken in by flights of flowery appeal. He
(the arbitrator) will recognize that the common law rules
ot evidence are not strictly applied. This does not mean
he will calmly admit all sorts of irrelevant matters and
hearsay evidence. He (the lawyer) knoiWs thaJt tJhe arbitrator will recognize weak evidence for what it is and will
reco~,UZe the deficiencies of second and third hand testimony.''
We respectfully state that this is a country that has
long ·nurtured and cherished the jury system and has espoused a confidence in it that has prohibited a change in it
for a hundred and seventy-five years. It is one of the very
foundations of our Constitutional system and is pr01vided
for in the Constitution of the United States ·and of all of
the states in the Union.
The reason insurance companies desire an artbitration
panel is obvious. It merely means that one of the litigants,
the insurance company, wants to try its case be·fore a select
court. It merely moons hearsay testimony, seoondary and
insubstantial evidence, inuendo and implication are the hallmarks of trial by arbitration, which are rightfully prohi!bitPJ in a court of law. It merely means that the insurance
companies, by this devious route, have selected a battle
ground wherein they control all of the command points
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and have full and sometimes exclusive knowledge of the
terrain. It is a battle fie1d upon which they have fought
numerous battles and upon which their captains are daily
associated with the personnel of the supposedly neutral referee. 'Dhe a~bitrator, in the coUTse of !his experience, may
sit on a number of cases in which counsel :f.or the insurance
company appears, but he is not like~y to see counsel for
the litigant or the litigant himself on any more than one
occasion.

The AAA claims that their process is speedy. Some
claimants 1oontend that ~hey could have had a much more
rapid hearing in a court of law. One case that counsel for
the respondent is familiar with had a request forr arbitration duly filed on February 13, 1963, and without delay
caused by either litigant, the case was ultimately tried on
January 30th, 1964, before the wbitratiorn tr.ihunal.. If
this is a standard, one might w<mder if that is "speedy."
The AAA and 1he appellant contend that arbitration
is just. The respondent has podnrted out many unjust features abo~e, of which the f1oilowing are the most flagrant
examples:
1. There is no pDovision :f.orr requiring testimony from
out of state witnesses.
2. In marny states, such as Utah, there is no provision
for the attendanoe of witnesses within the forum.
3. The selection of the arbitrator 1s made by the Association irrespective of experience or motives and the insurance oompanies are muah moDe likely to be associated
and acquainted with him than the da.imant.

4.

The arbitrator is immune from mistake. There is
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no method by which his finding can be appealed nor his
errors corrected.

The arbitration forum selected is a forum of the
insurance companies and denies the claimant an equal right
of appointment.
5.

The rules of evidence by which the rights of the
claim:ant are protected are abandoned if the arbitrator so
desires and, therefore, there is no hope of due process as
the claimant might expect in a eourt of law.
6.

7. The !Claimant is forced to litigate at a place selected by the Arbitration Association regardless of ~conven
ience to himself and witnesses, which, according to the rules
of the American Arbitration Association, may be within or
without the state wherein the ccurrence happened.

8. Witnesses are not requiTed to testify under oath
and, therefore, the moral sanction that attends a proceeding at law are denied the litigant.
The evidence may ibe introduced that is completely
hearsay and .evidence may be introduced by affidavit, theTeby denying the litigant of a right of cross e~aminati0111.
9.

The AAA contends that their proceeding is economical. The filing fee for the claimant is $50.00. The cost
of each day the proceeding exceeds the first day is $25.00.
In the event that the proceeding runs ,afteT 6:00 P.M. on
any day, the charge is $3.00 per hour. All chargeable to
the claimant if he institutes the proceeding. Rule 4, Section 11, indicates that in certain cases "in prolonged or in
~dal cases, the parties may agree to the payment of a
fee" to the arbitrator. Under what circumstances these
might be, the claimant does not know.
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Another interesting aspect to the "economical" claim
of the Arbitration Society is that specified under Se·ctioo
16, Taking of a Stenographic Record:
"The tribunal dea:-k shall make the necessary arrangements .for the taking of steno~aphic record of the
testimony whenever such record is requested by one
or more parties. 'I1he requesting party oc parties shall
pay the ·cost of such recoro as provided in Rule 8, Section 38."
As pointed out above, 1Jhe claimant is required, if he
wants a record, to pay the ·oost orf the reporter plus the
cost o!f transcribing, if it is to be O!f any benefit to the arbitrator. 'Dhis, as all lawyers will attest, is no small charge.
The claimant must arrange fbr and pay for the attendance
of witness and in states where such attendance is not provided for by statute, as in this state, the obtaining o!f witnesses becomes an extreme hardship upon the claimant and,
needless to say, an e~, for there are few witnesses who
desire to attend for the witness fees provided by law.
We have taken ·considerable time to controvert the suggestio!l1!s in rthe journals quoted as authorities. We respectfully state that our opinion, based upon experience, would
be as persuasive as the opinion of an insuTance company
attorney writing in an insurance law journal concerning a
matter in which he has a prejudicial interest. We respectfully state that these citations are not authority and should
not be given any more weight or treated with any more
dignity than the reflections of counsel :Lior the respondent
set forth aborve.
Getting to the real meat of the question raised, it should
be sufficient to state that the Utah Supreme Court on three
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occasions and the United States District Court in and for
the District of Utah on one occasion, (Shumaker v. Utex
Ex-ploration Co., 157 F. Supp. 68), has stated the provisions substantially similar to that contained in this insuri.Lnt-e policy are void for good and sound reasons. Those
casls, with the exception of the Shumaker case, were cited
by the appellant, but the appellant casually says that they
are distinguishable. This same argument was made to 1Jhe
learned trial judge who, after listening to the wguments
and taking the case under advise·ment, was nnconvinced.
For example, the distinction made between the Fox Film
Corporation vs. Ogden Theatre case, 82 Utah 279, 17 Pac.
2d 29-l, and this case see1ns to be that arbitration in this
case does not deal with procedure, but with substance of
the agreement ·and that arbitration in the Fox Film CoTIJoration case dealt with procedure and nort substance. By
what method the appellant is able to oome to this conclusion is not known to the respondent. One would think that
the statements of the court in that case would be good evidence of the intent of that court and the field they intend~d to cover by their decision.
Appellant cites Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 580,
57 P:tc. 2d 1132. He says this case is nort in pomt fO!r here
the parties had agreed to arbitrate "all" disputes. Here
couns~l suggests that all the conracting parties intended
to litigate by arbitration was (a) lialbility, and (b) damages. (Brief page 23 and 24.) One might ask, "What else
is there left to litigate in any law suit but liability and damages?" Suppose that Mrs. Barnhart in this case had purchased only a policy for uninsured motorist protection.
What then would be left for the court if arbitration was
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given the task of determi1lling liability and damages? In
this particular case, the only part of the contract in issue
is the uninsured mortorisrt provision and nOithing is left for
any inquiry by the oOil.l:rt. What more oould be a complete orusrter orf jurisdiction in the realm of liability and damages or any other judilcial realm insofur as the uninsured
motorist poicy is concerned.
The appellant makes a strained and teil1UOIUS argument
in order to difterentiarte Latter vs. Holsum Bread Company,
108 Utah 3:64, 160 Pac. 2d 421. All orf the argument is
based upon the concurring opmion of Justiloo Woilf. The
appellant fails to ooncede that three o~her justices in that
case agreed as follows:

"It is almost the universal rule fuat in the ahsence o[
a statute to the contrary, an agreement to arbitrate all
future disputes 'thereafter arising under the contract
does nort constitute a bar to an action om the comaJCt
involving such dispute, om the ground that it seeks
to deny rto the parties judicial remedies and therefore
is oontracy to public policy."
Apparently the dis:tinctioo contended fbr in the Latrt:e.r
vs. Ho,lsum Bread case ~s that the court in its language used
the word '1all" before "di~rputes", (Note: The cootrruct in
that case did not use "all" disputes), whereas, in our case
we are only talking abolllt uninsured motorists. We respectfully s:tate to the court that this is a difference without any more distinction than if the eontracts involved in
the Fox Film Oorporatio!ll vs. Ogden Theatre Company,
Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff .and Latter vs. Holsum Bread company eases had stated that only the question orf liability
and damages would be litigated and all OltJher questions
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would be reserv("Cl to the court. If these cases had said
that, then it is the contention of the appellant that this
court would not Ita ve held, in those cases, that arbitration
was a void provision.
In respect to the policy, it is interesting to note the
following language in paragraph 9 of part 4. This paragraph reads as follows:
"Action against company: no action shall lie against
the company unless as a condition precedent thereto,
the insured or his legal representative has fully complied with the terms of this endorsement nor unless
within one year from the date of the accident: (a) stilt
for bodily injury has been filed against the uninsured
motorist in a court of competent jurisdiction or (b)
agreement as to the amount due under this coveTage
has been CO[l[Cluded, or ( C) the insured or his legal
representative has fonnally instituted arbitrartio.n pT'Oceedings."
1

The important aspect of this provision is that (a), (b),
and (c) use the disjunctive worn "or." One could reasonably conclude that all that has to be done to comply with
the terms of the policy is to comply with all of the other
tenns of the policy and do any one of the three specified
in (a). (b), or (c). In this instance the insured filed a
suit against the uninsured motorist as required by paragraph (a). This paragraph seems extremely burdoosome
upon the insured for he does not own the suit and, as in
this case, the law suit has been sitting without prosecution
for more than a year. Or (b) he can agree with the company, \Vhich in this case could not be done. Or (c) he
could institute arbitration proceedings. Apparently compliRJ.ice with (a) would have been sufficient and, there-
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fore, the question orf arbitration is superfluous. No contention is made that the insured did not comply with all
the other terms of the policy.
Paragraph 6 of Part 4 under arbitration states in the
event fuat company and the insll.Wed are unab~e to agree
"then upon written demand of either, the matte·r or matters upon which such person and company do not agree,
shall be settled by arbitration in acooroance with the
rules o[ the Am_e~rican Mbitration Association, and
judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators,
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and the company agrees to consideT
itself bound and to be bound by any award made by
the arbitrators pursuant to this endocsement."
One would wonder, therefore, ·under the above stated
teTms of the policy what provisions are left to 1Jhe court
for determination. If this is a condition precedent, then
after the condition is per:fhrmed, what is there left forr the
court except to enteT judgment perfunctorily as a clerk
might.
One could wonder who will be 1:Jhe arbitrators for the
pro\1sion merely states that the arbitration shall be in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, but it says nothing a:bout who the arbitrators will
be or how they will be appomted or whether they will be
appointed under the auspices of the American Arbitration
Association. Are these rules mere~y incorporated by reference? Are we compelled, as a matter of language, in
the poHcy, to arbitration before this particular tribunal?
We respectfully stae that the policy is silent as to these
matters.
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The law is tmiversally established in states that have
not modified the common law by statute. American Jurisprudence says the law in these states is as follows:
co~ts have held almost universally that under
the common law the parties to a dispute may not oust
the jurisdiction of the ,courts by an arbitration agreement. And an agreement is not taken out of the scope
of the rule by an express stipulation that suit shall be
subject to the condition that arbitration first be had,
except as it may be a condition precedent to suit where
the agreement is for the! puvpose of finding preliminary facts or ascertaining values. Although many
courts in supporting the rule have called such contracts
illegal and void, this characterization is criticized as
wanting in strict accuracy, in view of the authority sustaining enforcement of executed agreements and of other cases that support a right to reoover damages in 1oase
of breateh. Other courts have variously held that ~such
agreements are invalid, vo~dable, or unenforceable, and
that either of the parties to the arbitration agreement
may revoke or abrogate the agreement at any time
prior to the making of a valid award, and that notwithstanding such agreement the courts will deternrlne
all disputes between the parties." 5 Am. Jur. 2d 547,
Sec. 36.

"The

The New York decisions set forth on page 24 orf appellant's brief, are cases which have been decided in a state
which has adopted the uniform arbitration act. These
cases are, therefore, not in point.
In Wilson vs. Gregg, 208 Oklahoma .2~1, 255 Pac. 2d
517 (1952) (1953), the court in an exhaustive review of the
law. including cases under the statutes and cases under the
common law, summarized its research and the law as follows:
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"Generally arbitration agreements to submit controversies arising in the future have been held unenforceable because they deprive the oourts of jurisdiction
and are contrary to public pO!licy. The decisions of
some courts hold that such argeements are void. Other
courts hold that such agreements are voidable and still
others hold that such agreements are nort enforceable.
There is a line of decisions which hold that even though
the agreernent is not enforceable it is binding if acted
upon by both parties thereto and an award made.
Some authorities have held that an agreement tO submit minor elements of ~ future controveTSy to arbitration is binding. There is authority both in the decisions of the ·oourts and in text writers sustaining
arbitration provided for by constitutions, by-laws, rules
and regulations of lodges and ortller vo~untary associations on the theory that such associations make their
own rules and laws and the courts will not interfere
with such associations enforcement of such rules. But
the great weight of autho~ity is to the effect that an
agreement such as is involved in this case is not enforiCeable and :that an action will not lie based upoo 1:Jhe
findings and conclusions of the arbitratocs. There are
decisions to the effect 1Jhat agreements to arbitrate
are a condition precedent to an action on the original
cause. We are not dealing in this case with any of
the exceptions or distinctions above mentioned. In
Oklahoma the common law orf arbitration prevails."

Ameriean Jurisprudence in quoting the above case
and in quoting the case orf Myers vs. Jenkins, 63 Ohio State
101, 57 NE 1089, and the annotation found in 135 ALR
85, says as follows:
''The primary difference between a clause in a contract
under which it is agreed that future differences ari5-
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ing out of the contract will be arbitrated, and an agreement to submit to arbitration, a controversy that has
already arisen, is that in the former case there is an
attt.~pt to contra~t away the right to ,appear in a
court before a cause of action arises, while in the latter ca~e. a cause of action has alredy accrued and the
parties agreeing to arbitration make a choice as to
the form in which the existing controversy may be
cited." 5 Am. JUT. 2d 548, Sec. 36, Norte 15.
Tha vVilson vs. Gregg case cited many prominent and
respectable courts including tJhe decision of 1:1his court in the
case of Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, cited above. It would
seem inappropriate to, at this date, overrule such a respectable body of law and add additional fi<res to the charge
being made against the judiciary of inconstancy and peTtidy.

Some courts have attempted to distinguish a general
arbitration provision from a condition precedent provision.
The court will note that the specific language of our oontract says that arbitration is the condition precedent. Our
eourt has considered the case of Blodget Company vs. Bebe
Company, 214 Pac. 38, and has cited that decision in its
opinions with approval. That decision took up the question of whether a contract that stated that arbitration is
a condition precedent escapes the application of the common law rule that it is a void provision. In that case the
cow1: said:

"It is apparrent that where the cause of action is not
complete until the establishment of a prescribed mode
of a given fact, such fact is necessarily a ·condition
precedent to the right of action; but where the right
of action is complete, the bringing of suit thereon is,
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of course, not impliedly subject to the oonditiorn that
arbitration first be had, nor can it be expressJy made
so unless we are prepared to abandon the establis:hed
rule. This we think obvious from a CO!l1Sideration of
the general rule itself and the consequences necessarily
flowing from its appiioation. The rule is that an agreement for the arbitration of any dispute thereafter to
arise under a given contract will nort be enfo['lced by
the oorurts. But such an agreement--is itself an attempt
to make arbitratioo a eotnditiOltl precedent to the bringing of suit and its effecrt is no different than from that
of an express stipulatioo that arbitration shall be a
condition precedent. Assume that the latter is binding; what woud be the eourt's pursuit under it? A
disput arises and arbitration is had. An award bedng
made, can a party to the stipulation say 'I have submitted the questioo in dispute to arbitration and thus
complied with the condition precedent; nmv I will bring
my suit upon my original claim and ignore the award.'?
Evidently not, for if so the arbitration would be an
idle proceeding.''
CONCLUSION

The reSipOIIldent respectfully urges that the decision of the
trial court be affumed. To do otheTWise would require
the reversal of substantial law upon which rights and duties have beoome fixed. In this particular case, the respondent, because she relied upcm the prior decisions of
this court co!Uld, if they were now revised or distinguished,
find he,rself without any remedy either under the contract
or in ~court. This we submit would be a harsh and unjust
penalty.
The respondent further urges the ooort to sustain the
decision of the trial court on the basis of public policy.
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Already too many judicial safeguards have been lost by
legislative assignment, private barter and judicial abclication.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Respondent
290 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

